BOOK REVIEWS

NOT THE DAYS OF CLAUSEWITZ

Smith, General Sir Rupert. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin, 2005. 428pp. £25

Military theorists around the globe have noted changes in the landscape of warfare—nonstate actors, asymmetric threats, technology proliferation, etc.—and suggested that the military forces currently fielded by Western nations are not equipped to respond to them. The latest product of this analysis is *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World*, by General Sir Rupert Smith.

Smith certainly has the appropriate credentials to write about the topic. He commanded the British 1st Armoured Division in the first Gulf war and was commander of UN forces in Bosnia at the time of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. After three years as General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland, he became Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR), serving as second in command to a U.S. general, Wesley Clark, during the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.

The variety of the author's experiences throughout his distinguished career is critical, because these experiences constitute the framework for his thinking about war. First, he emphasizes the

importance of separately considering the effects of force at the three levels of war: tactical, operational (or theater, as Smith prefers), and strategic. Having held commands at each level, he has gained his appreciation of this firsthand. Second, much of Smith's command experience has been as part of coalitions, which he recognizes will continue to play a significant role in future warfare. Finally, he taxonomizes modern warfare—which he dates from the wars of Napoleon—into three distinct forms of war, corresponding roughly to three historical periods: interstate industrial war, the Cold War (which he regards as primarily an anomaly of the era of mutually assured destruction), and "war amongst the people." Just as Smith has commanded troops at each of the levels of war, he has served in some capacity in all three forms of war.

The most novel contribution Smith makes is his discussion of the implications of "war amongst the people." This is grounded in the idea that troops today are committed for much different reasons than in the days of Clausewitz,

and against much different enemiesenemies who do not wear a uniform but move freely "amongst the people." Smith uses this idea to examine past conflicts, touching on the guerrilla fighters operating on the Iberian Peninsula in the Napoleonic wars before moving on to analyze the British successes in Malaya, the French and American failures in Vietnam, and the two Gulf wars. Thereafter, he develops a series of questions for commanders to ask prior to the employment of force and devotes the penultimate chapter to applying these questions, albeit post hoc, to his experience in Bosnia.

The Utility of Force is not a scholarly work, nor does it claim to be; it has few footnotes and no bibliography, but neither does it need them. The book is not military history but rather a skillfully presented interpretation of certain trends in the history of warfare. Meanwhile, it raises a number of important questions that all future strategic leaders should be considering.

ROBERT BOLIA Air Force Research Laboratory Wright-Patterson Air Force Base



Fontenot, Gregory, E. J. Degen, and David Tohn. On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005. 539pp. \$34.95

On Point, as stated in its opening pages, is clearly intended for a professional military audience. General Eric K. Shinseki, former chief of staff of the Army, commissioned this work in 2003 as an after-action review. The overarching purposes were to educate soldiers and defense professionals with respect

to the conduct of combat in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and to suggest implications for continued U.S. Army transformation.

In telling the story of the Army in OIF, the authors appeal not only to the target audience but to the general public at large through objective and informative analysis. On Point provides a clear appreciation for the complexities involved in planning, preparation, and execution of military operations across the range of military operations. Further, On Point provides the lay reader insight into the after-action-review process, which remains critical to advancing institutional learning and improving the future application of the armed forces as an instrument of national power.

On Point tells the story from a decidedly Army perspective. The discussion encompasses topics essentially in three parts, from the strategic-operational level down to the tactical level of war. The first discusses the Army preparation for OIF. The second focuses on the ground war through the conclusion of major offensive combat operations. It is discussed in four phases: Phase Ipreparation, Phase II—shaping the battlespace, Phase III—decisive offensive operations, and Phase IV—posthostilities. Finally there is an analysis of the campaign's implications regarding future conflict, Army organization, and transformation to a future force. Army successes and failures are clearly delineated, along with the authors' recommendations for the future.

Like many military books written by military officers and professionals, On Point often suffers from an overemphasis on acronyms and abbreviations, making the writing sometimes dry and overly detailed. Nonetheless, the

authors have effectively blended official battle narratives, after-action reviews, and eyewitness accounts of the war to emphasize one or more of the central themes to be investigated by the OIF Study Group.

Shortly after its completion in 2004, On Point was available only online through links to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), and to a select group of officers fortunate enough to receive a limited edition produced by the Combat Studies Institute Press in 2004. This first edition from the Naval Institute Press makes the work available to the public in a single bound edition. Unlike the online version, the pictures, illustrations, graphics, and maps are difficult to read and interpret accurately due to poor printing and reproduction. Until this problem is corrected in a subsequent edition, the reader should refer to the color online version for any necessary clarification. Additional tools available to the reader include a complete glossary of military terms and acronyms, as well as a detailed U.S. order of battle for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Nonmilitary readers will no doubt need to consult both items early and often during their reading and study.

TERRY L. SELLERS Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army



Ellis, Jason D., and Geoffrey D. Kiefer. Combating Proliferation: Strategic Intelligence & Security Policy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004. 287pp. \$48

Jason Ellis, a former senior research professor at the National Defense University, and Geoffrey Kiefer, a researcher at NDU's Center for Counterproliferation Research, seek to illuminate the intersection between intelligence and America's "quest to prevent and manage WMD proliferation."

The authors focus on six topics, discussing the issues involved in each, and illustrate each with a pair of case studies. Chapter 2, "Standards of Evidence," focuses on intelligence concerning the Pakistani nuclear program and Chinese missile assistance, while the remaining five chapters address, in succession, estimative uncertainties and policy tradeoffs, intelligence surprise, intelligence sharing, military support, and warfighting in a WMD context. The North Korean nuclear program and Soviet/ Russian biological warfare activities serve as the case studies for the estimative uncertainties chapter. They are followed by studies on India's 1998 nuclear tests, North Korea's 1998 launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong-1, and U.S. intelligence sharing with Russia (concerning its nuclear and missile assistance to Iran) and the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), as well as the boarding of the Yin He along with the attack on the al-Shifa facility in Sudan. The final two case studies examine the Operation DESERT STORM air campaign and counterforce in DESERT FOX.

As indicated by the sixty-three-page notes section, the authors made an extensive effort to mine the open-source literature for relevant material. As a result, their case studies provide valuable accounts of some of the key examples of the intersection of intelligence and proliferation in recent years.

One shortcoming stems from Ellis's and Kiefer's desire to focus on current developments concerning the intersection of intelligence and proliferation. In

doing so, the authors have bypassed any discussion of older events that might have provided opportunities for some long-term perspective.

They report the recommendations of Admiral David Jeremiah's investigation of the intelligence community's failure to provide advance warning of India's 1998 tests. Yet those recommendations—including altering collection priorities, better human intelligence, and improved coordination—are eerily similar to those of the community's postmortem of its failure to warn of India's 1974 test. The similarities raise a number of questions—possibly, that the intelligence community has simply proven it is unable or unwilling to correct its shortcomings.

Another problem for the reader (although not the authors' fault) is that the book only briefly refers to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. There is only a brief mention of Colin Powell's presentation of intelligence to the UN, and none at all of the postwar findings on U.S. intelligence performance. Had the book been completed a year or two later, these would have been prime topics. However, Combating Proliferation is not a book overtaken by events but rather a valuable guide to the issues concerning intelligence and proliferation.

JEFFREY T. RICHELSON National Security Archive



Herspring, Dale R. The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2005. 512pp. \$45

Civil-military relations are the subject of considerable scrutiny and debate throughout the Clinton presidency. Unfortunately, the academicians, journalists, and occasional uniformed professionals who joined in that debate have been inexplicably mute since the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld regime came to power. So this inquiry by Kansas State University political science professor Dale Herspring offers a welcome shot of intellectual adrenalin to an enduringly important, if temporarily moribund, topic. Herspring confronts two issues that are central to the canonical discourse of civil-military relations: civilian control of the military by elected and appointed political officials, and the political neutrality or nonneutrality of those in uniform. Herspring is well qualified to address the subject, having spent twenty years as a foreign service officer in relatively senior State Department and Defense Department assignments, as well as some thirty-two years of combined active and reserve duty in the Navy.

Focusing his attention primarily on the senior ranks of the military—the controlled-rather than on the civilian controllers, Herspring considers the intersection of presidential leadership and military culture an arena of inevitable conflict. Where the two are compatible, he argues, conflict is minimized; where they are not compatible, the frequency and intensity of conflict are magnified. He holds that since the Truman administration the military has become progressively more political, displaying common interest-group behavior by using Congress and the media to serve its own institutional self-interest at the expense of dutiful obedience to executive civilian authority.

Herspring devotes a chapter to each of the twelve presidencies from Franklin D. Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Each chapter, identical in structure, begins with a brief examination of the leadership style of the president concerned, along with two or three case studies depicting the military's reaction to it on particular critical issues, and concludes with a discussion of two questions: To what degree did the president's leadership style mirror or violate military culture, and how did that style affect civil-military relations? Did military culture change or employ new methods to oppose change?

Conflict between senior civilian officials and the senior military, though inevitable, Herspring believes, can be mitigated by presidential behavior. Over time, such conflict has been most pronounced in administrations where presidential leadership style and military culture have been most at odds. Herspring adjudges the level of conflict as high in the Johnson, Nixon, and Clinton administrations; moderate under Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Carter, and George W. Bush; but minimal under Roosevelt, Ford, Reagan, and George H. W. Bush.

This is a book that should command attention from students of civil-military relations. Although it is an interesting read—thoroughly but not exhaustively researched, tightly and coherently structured—its ultimate value is as descriptive historical synthesis. It offers no conceptual breakthroughs and does not examine in any detail such important issues as the highly political behavior of senior officers like Colin Powell and Alexander Haig or the growing practice of retired senior officers, like William Crowe, to endorse presidential candidates

(arguably for political patronage) and, like Wesley Clark and Barry McCaffrey, to provide regular news commentary on controversial public policy issues; the firings and resignations of selected senior officers (John Singlaub, Michael Dugan, Frederick Woerner, Ron Fogleman, even Eric Shinseki), and the associated failure of senior officers to accept responsibility for gross military lapses like Abu Ghraib and the bombing of the Beirut Marine barracks, Khobar Towers, or the USS Cole; and, most notably, Iran-Contra and its aftermath, particularly the roles played by Robert McFarlane, John Poindexter, Oliver North, and Colin Powell. More discussion on these issues would have strengthened the author's thesis and the reader's understanding of military politicization and professionalism.

Although such omissions do not weaken the book noticeably, the author's avoidance of normative judgment is a shortcoming worth noting. Is conflict between civilian officials and the military healthy or unhealthy? Is there a proper distinction to be drawn between responsible military dissent and disobedience? Which of the military's obligations takes precedence, dutiful obedience to civilian authority or checking and balancing civilian impetuosity, ineptitude, or misconduct?

Such questions remind us that civilmilitary relations are an endless contest of principle and personality in democracies fledgling and mature. One suspects that this contribution from Dale Herspring will have the salutary effect of reminding us of that fact and rekindling much-needed debate on the subject.

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McCoy, Jennifer L., and David J. Myers, eds. The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2004. 342pp. \$49.95

By far one of the more interesting and challenging issues facing U.S. national decision makers today is what to do about Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution. Since Chavez came to power Venezuela has shifted from a staunch friend to a strident antagonist and become much more closely aligned with Cuba, and it now appears increasingly willing to find new markets for its oil. Given that Venezuelan crude supplies approximately 13 percent of U.S. energy needs, these are developments U.S decision makers cannot take lightly.

The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela attempts to explain how the political landscape of Venezuela evolved to the point where a Chavez victory was possible. In this effort, the editors succeed admirably. Not only does this work boast solid scholarship and impressive research, but it stands as a superb example of what an edited volume should be but all too rarely is.

The book begins with an exploration of the history of the Punto Fijo democracy, which was essentially an agreement between Venezuelan political elites, establishing a representative democracy. In chapter 1, David Myers examines how this agreement was reached and how, over time, the terms of the agreement became codified into the Venezuelan political landscape. The result was one of the most stable and long-lived democracies in South America.

Chapters 2 through 6 deal with various elements of Venezuelan society and how it reacted to or was incorporated within the Punto Fijo regime, including how eventually the regime could no longer be maintained in the face of increasing political stress. A variety of actors, from the urban poor to the professional military to Venezuelan intellectuals, are examined. Each chapter is well written and thought provoking and complements the other portions of the book.

Among its more intriguing conclusions is that an increasingly professionalized officer corps became a key component in the success of Venezuelan democracy. With professionalization came acceptance of civil control of the military and a greatly diminished role in internal security issues. When this changed in 1989, at the request of civilian authority, the officer corps became increasingly politicized. Today, a significant percentage, if not a majority, of formerly civic functions are carried out by military officers whose primary attribute is a fierce personal loyalty to Hugo Chavez.

Chapters 9 through 11 deal with policy decisions made during the Punto Fijo years and how, gradually, the existing political parties grew unable to cope with or meet the demands of an increasingly disillusioned public. Through this examination the reader grows to understand that it was this political failure that enabled Chavez to rise to power. Furthermore, by 1998 the vast majority of Venezuelan voters welcomed Chavez, believing change preferable to maintaining the status quo.

The description of the evolution of a representative Venezuelan democracy to a democracy of direct participation is compelling and fascinating. It is so well handled that one wishes the authors

had spent as much time dissecting the Chavez regime as those that preceded it. One of the few drawbacks is that there is little attention to an examination of Hugo Chavez and his inner circle of advisors.

This book is a must-read for anyone who wishes to get beyond Chavez's rhetoric and red beret. It would enrich any South American regional studies course and has applicability for other disciplines as well. Readers who take the time to consider The Unraveling of Representative Democracy in Venezuela will emerge richer for the effort. Among those who should read it are businessmen interested in Venezuelan markets. and any military officer assigned to the U.S. Southern Command.

Given the success McCoy and Myers have had in creating this book, it is only to be hoped that a companion is in the works.

RICHARD NORTON Naval War College



Bush, Elizabeth Kauffman. America's First Frogman: The Draper Kauffman Story. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2004. 221pp. \$28.94

War brings out the best as well as the worst in human nature. Freedom for Americans has always depended on the bravery and innovation of servicemen willing to endure danger and privation. Elizabeth Kauffman Bush has written a marvelous account of one such hero, her brother, Draper Kauffman—the nation's first frogman and the founder of the Navy SEALs.

Determined to follow in the footsteps of his father (Vice Admiral James

Laurence), Kauffman persevered at the Naval Academy despite his poor eyesight, which nearly prevented him from attending and initially denied him a commission in the Navy when he graduated in 1933.

Disappointed but undaunted, he accepted a position at a shipping company, U.S. Lines, in New York, where he became assistant operations manager. His two-month tenure at the company's German office in 1939 convinced him that the United States had to join with France and Great Britain to stop Hitler. When he returned home, Kauffman joined the free-lecture circuit urging early American intervention in the war, in defiance of the prevailing isolationist sentiment in the United States.

Eager to do more to defend the cause of freedom, Kauffman joined the American Volunteer Ambulance Corps, which placed itself under the direct command of the French army. He served with valor as an ambulance driver during the Battle of France in May-June 1940 before the Germans captured him. He languished several weeks in a Nazi prisoner-of-war camp, dropping forty pounds before the American embassy secured his release.

After a six-week voyage from Portugal, Kauffman arrived in Great Britain at the peak of Hitler's bombing campaign. He joined the Royal Navy and became expert at the harrowing task of diffusing delayed-action German bombs and mines during the Blitz. He narrowly escaped with his own life when a mine he was working on blew up.

Kauffman returned home to recover from his wounds, and in November 1941 he finally received his commission in the U.S. Naval Reserve. His experience in

Great Britain won him the job of launching the Navy's Bomb Disposal School, receiving his first Navy Cross for dismantling a five-hundred-pound bomb dropped in Hawaii by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Chosen in 1943 to establish an underwater demolition school in Fort Pierce, Florida, Kauffman rigorously trained teams later known as frogmen (later to be known as the Navy SEALs) to defuse bombs and destroy submerged obstacles deployed by the Nazis to impede the invasion of France. Kauffman received his second Navy Cross for valor in leading underwater demolition teams at Tinian in the Pacific, as well as advance demolition teams at the invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa.

When the war ended, Draper Kauffman continued his distinguished naval career, commanding the destroyer USS

Gearing and the heavy cruiser Helena. Promoted early to rear admiral, Kauffman eventually became superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. His naval career concluded with two postings: as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, and then as commandant of the Ninth Naval District and the Great Lakes Training Center, north of Chicago. Kauffman retired from the Navy in 1973, revered by those with whom he had served. The author of this work is Kauffman's sister, Elizabeth Kauffman Bush. Her historical analysis is precise, concise, and judicious. She has not only mastered such technically intricate topics as bomb demolition but conveys them in a way that keeps the reader riveted.

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